"``Bozo" or "``Mito"? Ruling as an Outsider in Brazil

Guilherme Stein and Marcelo Griebeler

Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, 2025, vol. 78, issue 4

Abstract: We design a signaling model to explain how a political outsider can implement his agenda without sharing power with establishment politicians. There are two strategies for the president: to ally with the traditional political parties or to nominate a popular public figure seen by the public as a corruption fighter. Since president's type (honest or dishonest) is uncertain, the public figure can lend legitimacy to the presidency by signaling that the president is honest. If the signal is informative, the president’s agenda is implemented. We use our model interpret assorted political facts about President Bolsonaro’s government.

Date: 2025
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