Mistrust, Misperception, and Misunderstanding: Imperfect Information and Conflict Dynamics

Daron Acemoglu and Alexander Wolitzky

No 31681, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Building on theories of international relations, we analyze how mistrust (uncertainty about an adversary's preferences or capabilities), misperception (imperfect observation of an adversary's actions), and misunderstanding (non-degenerate higher-order beliefs) can lead to conflict and drive its dynamics. We develop our analysis in the context of three classic models: a one-shot security dilemma or spiral model; a repeated version of the security dilemma that allows for gradual learning about the opponent's type, as well as the possibility of conflict spirals, traps, and cycles; and a deterrence model. We relate these models to the empirical literature and to current and historical episodes of conflict.

JEL-codes: C73 D74 P00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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